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Abstract:  
This article argues that the Islamic finance (IF) industry, in its ideological foundations is very 
similar to the stakeholder and Business ethics theory in western though. The paper further 
argues that the principles of Maqasid al sharia and Maslaha form the basis of the Islamic 
finance jurisprudence and need to be applied throughout the Industry via regulatory standards. 
However, industry practices of the IF industry do not always follow the Maqasid and Maslaha 
principles primarily because of the lack of regulation and standard setting at the international 
level. This article examines the different regulatory framework that are being utilised in 
different jurisdictions to regulate the Islamic finance Industry. This article takes the examples 
of Pakistan, Kuwait and the UK as representing three different regulatory frameworks in 
practice around the globe and then suggests the best possible method of incorporating the 
Maqasid and Maslaha into the regulation and practice of Islamic finance via a principle based 
Meta regulatory framework. We take an example from the Basel accord on banking best 
practices and argue that the Islamic finance industry also needs an International Meta 
regulatory framework like Basel, which can cater to the specific needs of the IF industry 
globally, even where jurisdictions do not accept Islamic law as a valid source of law so that the 
IF industry can incorporate the Maqasid of financial intermediation i.e. to ensure socio-
economic justice in society. 
 






                                                          






The growing demand by Muslim investors and customers for a financial system which 
is in line with their religious beliefs has led to the Islamic finance industry emerging as the 
fastest growing segment of the global financial sector,1 with Islamic Financial Institutions 
(IFIs) operating in more than 25 jurisdictions.2  Such growth has, however, brought to light 
some of the shortcoming of the industry’s practices and raised questions about how both the 
religious and the financial dimensions of the industry should be regulated. Given that IFIs 
operate in both Islamic and secular jurisdictions3, devising a universal regulatory framework is 
fraught with difficulty. This article will explore the challenges of regulating IFIs in different 
types of jurisdictions, and will then go on to advocate a meta-regulatory approach that could 
be applied by well-established supranational bodies.   
The origins of the modern Islamic financial industry can be traced back to the 1960’s, 
when the Mit Ghamar bank was started in Egypt,4 though the underlying commercial practices 
and norms can be traced back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad (the Prophet of Islam) 
from the early 7th century. However, the modern day Islamic financial sector has come a long 
way from the basic trade contracts of medieval Arabia, catering to the financial needs of 
modern society with Sharia-compliant complex financial products such as Sukuk (bonds), 
Musharakah (partnerships), Ijara (leases), Muadarabah (agency contracts), Muarabaha (cost 
                                                          
1 See <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-28365639> 
2 <http://www.ey.com/EM/en/Industries/Financial-Services/Banking---Capital-Markets/EY-
world-islamic-banking-competitiveness-report-2014-15>. 
3           Secular jurisdictions, for this paper are categorised as those Jurisdictions which do not accept 
Islamic law as a valid source of law e.g. England is considered a secular jurisdiction 
4 Dahlia El-Hawary, Wafik Grais and Zamir Iqbal, “Regulating Islamic Financial Institutions: 
The Nature of the Regulated” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3227 (February 25, 
2004). SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=610268>. 
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plus transactions) Salam and Istisna (futures contracts).5 What distinguishes these particular 
products and justifies the label ‘Islamic’ is their compliance with the Sharia,6 primarily on 
account of the absence of Riba (usury) and Gharrar (speculation) in all financial transactions.7 
All IFIs, therefore must have a Sharia Supervisory Body (the SSB), to ensure that the principles 
of the Sharia  are being followed.8 The requirement for all IFIs to comply with the main 
principles of the Sharia  and the resulting presence of the SSB raise two main issues regarding 
the regulatory aspects of the Islamic finance industry. 
The first relates to the essential pre-requisites for compliance with the Sharia question 
. An initial problem is that the Sharia is not a single code of conduct but has a number of 
different connotations and interpretations.9 Yet despite the differences of interpretation 
amongst different schools of thought10, it is possible to identify certain common features in all 
                                                          
5 Mohamad Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance (Karachi, Pakistan, Idaratul 
Ma'aririf 2000). 
6 In this paper, the term Islamic law and Sharia are used interchangeably. However, in 
contemporary understanding ‘Islamic law’ is deemed to be an all-encompassing term used to denote 
concepts like ‘fiqh’, ‘usul’, ‘qanun’, ‘urf’, ‘madhab’, ‘fatwa’ and ‘sharia’ itself.  Jasser Auda, 
MAQASID Al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: a systems approach. The International Institute 
of Islamic Thought, VA, USA, 2008. 
7 Ibid Usmani 
8 F E Vogel and S L Hayes Islamic Law and Finance, Religion, Risk and Return (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International) 1998. 
9           Sharia, loosely defined means the principles of law that have been defined in the basic sources 
of Islam i.e. The Quran and the Sunnah. Sharia itself cannot be considered a system of laws, however 
a better definition of sharia is that it is a social system based on a loose set of principles derived from 
the Islamic faith and teaching. This can be differentiated from the concept of Islamic law, which is a 
much narrower definition and is reserved for those laws that have been promulgated by different 
jurisdictions based on the Sharia principles.  
10         School of thoughts refer to the different schools of Fiqh. Fiqh, as contrasted to Islamic law and 
Sharia, is the jurisprudence, which has been developed by the different recognised scholars belonging 
to one of the main schools of Jurisprudential thought i.e. Shafi, Maliki, Hanbali and Hanafi in the 
Sunni School and Ja`fari (inc. Mustaali-Taiyabi Ismaili) and Zaidiyyah schools of thought in the Shia 
school of thought. 
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Islamic financial rules and norms. These common features are in turn translated into common 
goals, practices and transactions that the IFI’s undertake. These include, but are not limited to, 
the use of the basic financial intermediation model of the two-tiered Mudarabah and 
Musharakah for provision of banking facilities that mirror conventional banking model,11  the 
presence of the SSB in ensuring the Sharia compliance and the role of the fatwas in deriving 
legitimacy for the financial products and services. There are numerous other commonalities 
between the Islamic financial intermediation model across the spectrum but these three features 
all differentiate Islamic financial institutions from their conventional counterparts and thus 
have a unique jurisprudential and legal position. So, the question can therefore be re-
contextualised in the following manner: what is it that makes an Islamic financial institution 
‘Islamic’ per se and different from a conventional financial institution? Is it the self-declaration 
of a financial institution that makes a financial institution ‘Islamic’ or is it the regulatory 
classification that determines whether an institution is Islamic or not? I argue in this article that 
determining whether a financial institution body is Islamic or not and therefore complies with 
the basic precepts of the Sharia  is easier in those jurisdictions which recognise the Sharia  as 
a source of law.12 Therefore, the question then is: in a jurisdiction where the underlying 
principles of the Sharia  are not recognised by regulators or the judiciary, and financial 
institutions self-declare their operations as ‘Islamic’, how can the supervisory and regulatory 
authorities best engage with the industry? 
                                                          
11 Mudarabah in simple terms can be defined as an investment partnership based on an agent/ 
principal relationship, where the agent is called the Mudarib and the principal/investor is called the 
Rab-ul-mal. Musharakah in simple terms can be defined as simple equity participation partnership. 
For more details, see; Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance (Karachi, Pakistan, Idaratul 
Ma'aririf 2000). 
12 The range of recognition may vary amongst these jurisdictions from being purely sharia based 
eg Iran and Saudi Arabia, to having a parallel system of common/ civil law along with sharia eg 
Pakistan, Malaysia, down to those jurisdictions where sharia is recognised but is not the main 
governing source and is invoked in very exceptional circumstances e.g. Turkey. 
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This then brings us to the second issue: whether it is possible for the Islamic finance 
industry to have a universal legal doctrine or a set of universal common principles which are 
both acceptable at an international level (in both Islamic and non-Islamic jurisdictions), and 
can provide guidance to the supervisory and regulatory authorities on how best to engage with 
the industry? In this article, I argue that one such doctrine is the interpretive and jurisprudential 
doctrine from within the Sharia called the Maqasid al Sharia.13 This can be translated as 
meaning the objectives of Sharia. In less simplistic terms, this means the normative outcomes 
that the Sharia aims to achieve in a social, religious and economic context. This concept of 
Maqasid al Sharia or intended outcome has a significant role to play in the current Islamic 
finance industry, since the industry claims to be adhering to the basic principles of the Sharia 
pertaining to finance such as providing services and financial instruments devoid of Riba and 
Gharar and upholding the basic tenets of Islamic commercial law (Fiqh al muamlat). The 
Maqasid al Sharia for Islamic finance can therefore have said to be: promoting social and 
economic welfare, equitable distribution of wealth, public welfare and act as a catalyst for 
development, abolition of usury and speculative trading. Therefore, as a common principle of 
operations all IFI’s must be working towards the above-mentioned goals and aims and be 
ethical in their operations. The question that I explore in this article through a theoretical and 
comparative analysis is to see whether the regulatory regimes in different countries do justice 
to the aims set out by the IFI’s as an industry within their respective regulatory models. 
I argue that the Maqasid of financial intermediation under the Sharia can best be 
explained through an analogy and comparison with the stakeholder theory in western corporate 
                                                          
13 The closest idea to Maqasid al sharia can be the idea of ‘raison d'être’ or reason or 
justification for existence; M H Kamali, Maqasid Al-Shari'ah: The Objectives of Islamic Law 
(Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University Islamabad) 1999 
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governance thought,14 both having their roots in the wider ‘business ethics’ ideology and both 
focusing on the socio-economic betterment of society through financial intermediation.15 
However due to the dominance of the neo-liberal political and economic ideology that is not 
always the case, which is a problematic issue for the Islamic finance industry. Therefore, I 
                                                          
14 For a detailed explanation of stakeholder thought please see: Ackerman, B. A., Alstott, A 
‘The Stakeholder Society,’ (1999). Yale University Press, New Haven, CT; Andriof, J. And 
Waddock, S. (2002). Unfolding Stakeholder Engagement. In: J.Andriof Et Al. (Eds. ). Unfolding 
Stakeholder Thinking - Theory, Responsibility and Engagement. Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing; 
Argandona, A. (1998). The Stakeholder Theory and The Common Good. Journal of Business Ethics. 
17, Pp. 1093-1102; Barnett, M. L. (2007). Stakeholder Influence Capacity and The Variability of 
Financial Returns to Corporate Social Responsibility. Academy of Management Review, 32(3): 794-
816; Berman, S. L., Wicks, A. C., Kotha, S. And Jones, T. M. (1999). Does Stakeholder Orientation 
Matter? The Relationship Between Stakeholder Management Model and Firm Financial Performance. 
Academy of Management Journal. 42 (5), Pp. 488-506; Boatright, J. R. (1993). Ethics and The 
Conduct of Business. New Jersey, Prentice Hall; Bradley R.Agle, Thomas Donaldson, R.Edward 
Freeman, Michael   C.Jensen, Ronald K.Mitchell And Donna J. Wood,  ‘Dailogue: Towards Superior 
Stakeholder Theory.’ Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol 18, Issue 2, Pp 153-190. 2008; Cadbury, A. 
(1992). The Report of the Committee On Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. Gee and Co, 
London; Carroll, A. B, (1993), Business and Society: Ethics and Stakeholder Management, 
Cincinnati, Oh: South-Western; Carroll, A. B. (1991). The Pyramid of Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Toward The Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders. Business Horizons, 
34(4): 39-48; Carroll, A. B. (1999). Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of A Definitional 
Construct. Business & Society, 38(3): 268-295; Carroll, A. B. (2004). Managing Ethically with 
Global Stakeholders: A Present and Future Challenge. Academy of Management Executive, 18(2): 
114-119; Collier, Jane and Roberts, ‘Introduction: An Ethic For Corporate Governance? Business 
Ethics Quarterly 11, 2001, 1:67-71; Donaldson, T., & Dunfee, T. W. (1994). Toward A Unified 
Conception of Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory. Academy of Management 
Review, 19: 252-284; Donaldson, T., & Preston, L. E. (1995). The Stakeholder Theory of The 
Corporation: Concepts, Evidence And Implications. Academy of Management Review, 20: 65-91; 
Donaldson, T. (1999). Making Stakeholder Theory Whole. Academy of Management Review. 24 (2), 
Pp. 237-241; Jensen M C. (2000). Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, And The Corporate 
Objective Function. Business Ethics Quarterly 12(2)2: 35-256; Jensen, M. C. And Meckling, W. 
(1976). Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Cost, And Capital Structure, Journal Of 
Financial Economics 3: 305-360; Jawahar I M, Mclaughlin, G L. ‘Toward A Descriptive Stakeholder 
Theory: An Organizational Life Cycle Approach.’ 2001 Academy Of Management Review 26(3): 
397-414; Johnson, H.L , ‘Business In Contemporary Society: Framework And Issues.’ 
(1971Routledge, London; Rossauw, G,J. Business Ethics: Where Have All The Christians Gone?' 
1994, Journal Of Business Ethics 13, 557-570. 
15 G Rice ‘Islamic Ethics and The Implications For Business’ (Feb 1999) Journal Of Business 
Ethics, Vol. 18, No. 4, 345-358, Published By: Springer Stable URL: 
Http://Www.Jstor.Org/Stable/25074059  Accessed: 17/09/2010 08:36 
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argue that to devise an effective regulatory and governance framework for the Islamic finance 
industry (especially in a non-Islamic jurisdiction), the standard-setting bodies and regulatory 
authorities ought to utilize the fundamental ideology of the stakeholder theory, which reflects 
to a considerable extent the Maqasid al Sharia of the Islamic financial intermediation model. 
Borrowing practical guidelines from the stakeholder theory and practice will allow the Islamic 
finance industry to adapt and integrate with the norms and rules of secular jurisdictions without 
losing its own religious and ethical characteristics. At the same time, following the stakeholder 
principles will also allow secular regulators to better understand and assimilate the Islamic 
model of financial intermediation and thus cater for the unique religio-ethical nature of IFIs.16  
Besides adapting the stakeholder model of governance, the appropriate regulatory 
framework for IFIs can be determined by focusing on the unique perspective of property rights 
as set out under the Sharia and the social, economic and legal needs of a whole range of 
stakeholders.17 In other words, rather than the IFIs focusing simply on the shareholders and 
creditors as the main category of beneficiaries, as is the norm under the neo-liberal economic 
and legal principles, other stakeholders like the investment account holders (IAHs) and the 
Sharia supervisory bodies (SSB) in Islamic financial intermediation model must also be catered 
for.18 Therefore the question that can be asked is: whether using the Maqasid al Sharia as the 
basis of the Islamic financial model, can we suggest an internationally recognised and 
acceptable framework for regulatory compliance for the Islamic finance industry? In the light 
                                                          
16 Z Iqbal and A Mirakhor ‘Stakeholder Model of governance in Islamic Economic system’ 
(2003) in the Fifth International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance, IRTI Islamic 
Development Banks Bahrain. 
17 M A Afzalur-Rahman, Islam Ideology and The Way of Life (The Muslim School Trust, 
London 1980). 
18 MAA Sarker, ‘Islamic Business Contracts, Agency Problem and the Theory of the Islamic 
Firm’ (1999) International Journal of Islamic Financial Services, 1 (2): 12-28 
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of these issues of governance and regulation I will suggest practical solutions for some of the 
more systemic Sharia governance and regulatory issues of the global Islamic finance industry. 
This article is divided into three sections; the first section examines the current regulatory 
framework, analysing the approaches taken at the supranational level and within three different 
types of jurisdictions to highlight the regulatory problems of trying to regulate the Islamic 
finance industry under a ‘common’ principled approach. The second section advances the view 
that we can use a Meta regulatory framework for the Islamic finance industry as this seems to 
be the most suitable for our current discussion and will set out the advantages of a meta-
regulatory approach in this context.  The third section of this article suggests a possible new 
framework for such an approach. 
 
2. The Current Regulatory Framework 
 
In this article I argue that, while uniform supervisory and regulatory standards have been 
set by the two main standard-setting bodies–the Audit and Accounting Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the Islamic Financial Services Board (ISFB) –their powers 
are limited. Although both the AAOIFI and the ISFB have published several regulatory 
standards addressing issues surrounding the internal corporate governance of IFIs and the 
Sharia compliance problems,19 these standards are purely voluntary ones, and there is no 
supervisory mechanism in use to certify their enforcement. The effect of these standards will 
therefore depend on the extent to which they are recognized in national law of a particular 
jurisdiction and since IFIs operate in different jurisdictions (common law, civil laws and 
Islamic law), it gives rise to several corporate governance issues as well as cross jurisdiction 
                                                          




regulatory issues. To understand the different regulatory approaches in practice across the 
broad spectrum of different jurisdictions we can identify three distinct groups for the purposes 
of this article:20 The first group is made up of states that have a central regulatory regime for 
the IFIs. The second group consists of jurisdictions which don’t have a central regulatory body 
for the Islamic finance industry yet have some legal mechanism in place for rule making and 
dispute settlement specifically catering the Islamic finance industry. The third group consists 
of such states which have no regulatory mechanism in place for Islamic finance industry yet 
allow individual IFIs to incorporate and operate. The detailed description of each group 
follows: 
 
i. The First Group 
The first group is formed of those jurisdictions which categorically recognise the Sharia 
as a valid source of law and allow legal rulings by the Sharia Boards (the SSB) and scholars 
involved in the legitimization of financial products and services in line with the Sharia precepts 
to be endorsed and accepted by the local judiciary and rule-making bodies. These jurisdictions 
also have in place a central the Sharia Regulatory Authority or a Central Sharia Supervisory 
Body, usually set up through a statutory enactment or via the central bank’s by-laws, to 
specifically cater to the Islamic finance industry. These jurisdictions tend not to have any major 
problems in supervising and regulating the Sharia aspects of individual IFIs, either externally 
or internally. The distinctive feature of these jurisdictions is that they will have a Central 
Regulatory Authority that can give verdicts about the Sharia standing of a particular financial 
instrument, contracts, transactions and any internal supervisory regime in place. In summary, 
                                                          
20 This distinction is by no means water tight and non-exhaustive. The purpose of highlighting 
these three distinct regulatory approaches is to highlight the en-vogue regulatory approaches and their 
advantages and shortcomings 
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these jurisdictions regulate (any and) all aspects relating to the Sharia in context of the IFI’s 
operation. This means that internal and external Sharia governance issues are dealt with by a 
Central Regulatory Body. In principle, these jurisdictions have a more ‘top down’ rule-based 
approach whereby the central bank (or the appropriate department of the government) 
continually regulates, monitors and licenses the IFIs. Countries which fall into this category 
are Pakistan, Sudan, Malaysia and Iran. 
The advantage of this particular approach lays in the certainty for IFIs in knowing 
exactly what rules and procedures they need to follow. Secondly, the compliance with the 
regulatory standards set out by the central regulators are controlled by the regulatory bodies 
either themselves or through a recourse to the local judiciary and other national dispute 
settlement processes, therefore instilling confidence in the public regarding the Sharia 
compliance of the individual IFI and allowing IFIs to easily follow mandatory governance 
standards.  
For example, in Pakistan the Islamic finance industry is regulated both by the State 
Bank of Pakistan (SBP) and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP).21 
The SBP handles all Islamic financial institutions such as Islamic banks,22 whereas the SECP 
handles all Sukuks,23 capital markets musharakah and mudarabah companies,24 as well as other 
non-banking Islamic entities. Both regulatory bodies have set out detailed rules for all 
activities, ranging from traditional corporate governance standards such as the mandate rules 
for voting at the AGMs and the role of the BODs, to remuneration of the executives, the 
appointment of the Sharia  Supervisory Board, the issuance of fatwas, the acceptability of new 







financial instruments and the capital requirements.25 In essence the central Islamic financial 
authority regulates all aspects pertaining to the working of the local Islamic finance industry. 
In addition, the SBP has adopted many of the regulatory standards set out by the IFSB and the 
AAOIFI via local statutory enactments and by-laws. As a result, the regulation of IFIs in 
Pakistan is in line with most of the IFSB and AAOIFI standards, bringing uniformity into the 
regulatory framework. 
The other unique aspect of this group’s regulatory model is that the local judiciary also 
takes a proactive role in dealing with the Sharia-related issues. The judgement of the Pakistan 
Supreme Court regarding the ban on Riba and Islamic banking in general is considered as a 
great judicial feat, laying down the ideological frontiers for modern day Islamic finance 
practices.26 Like the Pakistani judiciary, the Malaysian judiciary has also been very proactive 
in dispute resolution and recognition of new products and services27 and so has the Iranian and 
Sudanese judiciary. 
                                                          
25 <http://www.sbp.org.pk/departments/Publications.htm>. 
26 http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/file/jr_detailed_judgment_in_riba_case.pdf> 
Mahmood-ur-Rehman Faisal v Secretary, Ministry of Law PLD 1992 FSC and subsequently in: 
Federation of Pakistan v Mahmood-ur-Rehman Faisal PLD 2000 SC 770.  The arguments made by 
the parties involved were related to the actual understanding of the idea of Riba and its meaning. That 
decision opened up the debate surrounding the idea of a completely Islamic economic system which 
was to be devoid of any Riba based transactions and would follow the principles of Sharia. This 
decision was taken with a pinch of salt both in the practitioners’ circle as well as the academics 
circles. The respondent in the case, which was the government of Pakistan, argued for a watered-
down definition of Riba and argued based on certain Hadith that not all interest based transactions 
were to be deemed Rabawi. Even though the judgment was rendered against the government and the 
Government of Pakistan was given five years to implement the recommendation given by the Federal 
Shariat Court, the actual effect of the judgment was only partial, as this prompted the Islamic finance 
sector to mushroom, but only as a parallel financial system and not as the only legitimate financial 
system as had been originally envisaged by the Judgment itself. 
27 Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd v Adnan Omar [1994] 3 CLJ 735; Bank Kerjasama Rakyat 
Malaysia v Emcee Corporation [2003] 1 CLJ 625; Tahan Steel Corporation v Bank Islam Malaysia 
Bhd [2004] 6 CLJ 25; Malayan Banking Bhd v Ya’kup Oje & Anor. [2007] 5 CLJ 311 (HC 




 Whilst this type of regulatory approach works well in jurisdictions such as Pakistan and 
Malaysia, Iran and Sudan, where the Sharia is recognised as a source of law, it cannot be 
implemented in jurisdictions where there is no central Sharia authority, nor in jurisdictions 
where the judicial system does not accept fatwas as having a legal standing. In such 
jurisdictions, where there is not Central Sharia Authority and the judiciary does not accept the 
Sharia as a valid source of law, the IFIs are not deemed as separate and distinct entities in the 
eyes of the law and are dealt with under the same regulatory regime as conventional financial 
institutions, which leads to several regulatory and governance issues. As a result, there is a 
definite need for a different regulatory approach to cater for the diverse types of jurisdictions 
in which IFIs are operating.  
 
ii. The Second Group 
 
This brings us to the second group of jurisdictions. These are those jurisdictions which 
do not have a separate Central Sharia Regulatory Authority to supervise and regulate IFIs, yet 
still recognise the Sharia as a valid source of law for IFIs. These jurisdictions instead 
accommodate the Islamic financial institutions within their existing regulatory and legal 
framework. Kuwait is a good example of such a jurisdiction. The legal code provides for the 
Sharia to be the main legal source for all aspects of life.28 It also provides a definition of an 
IFI,29 thereby acknowledging the existence of Islamic financial industry as a separate entity. 
However, paradoxically another legal decree explicitly states that the Sharia principles will not 
                                                          
28 Zulkifi Hasan, Sharia Governance in Islamic Banks (Edinburgh University Press Ltd, 2012) 




be mandatory for commercial purposes.30 The central banking law allows IFIs to operate under 
the Sharia principles and requires the bank’s assembly to appoint a Sharia board in accordance 
with principles laid down by the AAOIFI.31 Therefore, this regime recognises IFIs as being 
separate entities yet does not provide for a completely separate regulatory framework for them. 
This approach had been the dominant approach for many of the other Middle Eastern 
jurisdictions like UAE, Qatar and Bahrain. However, there is now a very strong move in many 
of these jurisdictions to move towards a more centralised regulatory framework, as is the case 
in Pakistan and Malaysia.  
The other distinct feature of the regulatory approach in jurisdictions such as Kuwait is 
the issue of dispute settlement. Since, unlike the first group of jurisdictions, there is no central 
Sharia body to oversee the operations of individual IFIs, any dispute that does arise pertaining 
to the Sharia aspects is usually dealt with via one of the other existing legal/ religious bodies. 
So, for example, in Kuwait any such dispute is to be dealt with by the fatwa board in the 
Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic affairs rather than a specialised Sharia court. 32 In essence, in 
such jurisdictions there is no recourse to the mainstream judiciary for solving any disputes 
pertaining to the Islamic finance industry, which is in contrast to the approach in Pakistan and 
Malaysia. The responsibility of such a referral for disputes pertaining to the operational aspects 
of the IFI therefore falls on the Board of Directors (BOD) of the individual IFI. In doing so, 
such jurisdictions maintain the role of a traditional BOD, with the BOD being the main 
decision-making body of the IFI including those pertaining to sharia aspects of the IFI. 
Consequently, the corporate governance framework is essentially that of the traditional Anglo-
                                                          
30 Kuwaiti Commercial Code of 1981 Paper 102, (amended by; Council of Ministers Law No. 
15 of 2017 amending provisions of Law No. 1 of 2016 on the Promulgation of the Companies Law) 
31 Zulkifi Hasan (n 28) 
32 Zulkifi Hasan (n 28) 
14 
 
American corporation with central executive powers resting with the BOD and the SSB simply 
acting as an advisory body lacking any executive functions. This contrasts with the role of the 
SSB in IFIs in our first group (Pakistan, Malaysia and Sudan), where an SSB that is not 
convinced as to the whether a particular practice is compliant with the Sharia can challenge 
the ruling of the BOD and management on operational matters of IFI, and all such challenges 
are entertained through the local judiciary and the central sharia authority. However, in the 
second group the traditional corporate governance structure with the executive powers lying 
with the BOD are the norm, with limited recourse for the individual SSB to main stream dispute 
settlement processes. 
The structure of regulation and governance in the second group provides IFIs with a 
flexible environment to operate without there being a central rule-making body to make rules 
for them and oversee their operations. However, at the same time there is an acceptance of 
Islamic financial institutions as being separate and different from conventional financial 
institutions and thus a limited parallel legal and operational system for the IFI is provided. 
Where a financial institution is set up as an IFI, the law recognises it as such and provides for 
a partial separate regulatory regime under the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs.33 
Therefore, IFIs are afforded some flexibility and are permitted to rely on the non-judicial 
administrative bodies and some legislative intervention as and when the need arises.  
However, the shortcoming of this model is that it relies on the existence of a body such as 
the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs in Kuwait (and other similar jurisdictions), as well 
as the recognition of fatwas regarding the Sharia acceptability (or otherwise) of operational 
issues, to ensure the recognition of IFIs as distinct and separate entities under local laws and 
regulation. This leads to a complex regulatory and governance framework for Islamic financial 
                                                          




industry, leading to a number of possible confusions.  As a result, this regulatory approach may 
not be suitable as a blueprint for an international regulatory framework for IFIs in an 
international context due to the lack of recognition of the Sharia as a source of law in most 
jurisdictions.  
 
iii. The Third Group 
 
The third group of jurisdictions includes those states where there is no provision for 
recognition of the Sharia and therefore the regulation of IFIs is carried out under conventional 
regulations and laws, with some limited concessions given to IFIs (specifically for taxation 
purposes) to encourage the Islamic finance industry to keep operating in that jurisdiction. The 
best example of such an approach is the UK’s outlook towards IFIs. The UK, like many other 
non-Islamic jurisdictions, adopts what can be called a self-regulation model for Islamic finance 
industry, allowing the local IFIs to structure their own rules and regulations (so long as these 
do not conflict with the local regulations and laws). 
The UK, with its historically dominant position in world finance and an equally strong 
legal system, has grappled with the regulatory issues surrounding Islamic finance for some 
time now. The Financial Services Authority, the previous financial regulatory authority in the 
UK,34 published some basic policy papers detailing the working of IFIs and made some 
regulatory inroads into recognising and allowing IFIs some laxity in very limited aspects like 
taxation and deposit protection.35 However, since the FCA and its predecessors are all secular 
                                                          
34 This has now been replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation 
Authority. It is assumed for this papers point of view that no significant policy changes have been 
made since the replacement of FSA and Islamic finance continues to have the same status as had been 
under FSA’s regime. 
35 Deposit protection, which forms the backbone of consumer banking here in the UK, cannot be 
applied to IFIs since the operation of IFI’s current accounts are structured as mudarabah contract 
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regulators with no knowledge and expertise of the Sharia, the regulatory regime has not been 
adapted to incorporate the unique religious nature of IFIs.  
Nonetheless, several actions have been taken by HM Treasury and the FSA to allow for 
certain tax exemptions for Islamic house mortgages, for the waiver of stamp duties when 
dealing in murabahah home financing transactions, and for other such specific areas of Islamic 
finance.36 These exemptions given by the legislature, though very encouraging, do not go far 
enough to streamline the regulation of IFIs as distinct entities from the conventional financial 
institutions. Given that IFIs will be competing internationally with conventional financial 
institutions, it is clear that they will have a competitive disadvantage and will face reputational 
and Sharia governance risk when operating in secular jurisdictions in which the legal system 
does not recognise the Sharia as a valid source of law. An example of this is the case of Beximco 
Pharmaceutical vs Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC,37 in which the English courts refused to enforce 
a contract which had as a term that the governing law for the contract was to be the ‘principles 
of the glorious sharia’. The court took the view that the term ‘glorious sharia’ was too vague 
to be given any effect and did not deliberate any further, demonstrating the kind of legal and 
regulatory problems faced by IFIs in secular jurisdictions.  
                                                          
between the bank and the customer/ depositor, which is based on a pure profit and loss sharing 
contract, with no possibility of allowing the IFI to guarantee any sort of return or protection of the 
capital invested. To overcome this aspect for investment contracts the FSA allowed IFIs to allow the 
customers to sign a document stating that they did not want to abide by the statutory deposit 
protection thus allowing for the contract to remain within the ambit of sharia principles regarding 
finance. 
36 Whereby there are two sales of the house, the first one by the bank and the second one from 
the bank to the customer at a mark-up, thereby originally it would have attracted two stamp duties, 
making it extremely expensive for the customer to buy an Islamic mortgage, thereby making it 
financial unviable for the Customer to buy from IFI and thus making IFI’s unattractive and unable to 
compete with conventional mortgage lenders. 
37 [2004] EWCA Civ 19 pg. 11 para 40 
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A further Sharia compliance concern for IFIs operating in a jurisdiction like the UK is 
the issue of recognition of the religious pronouncements (fatwas) given by the Sharia 
Supervisory Bodies regarding the religious aspects of an IFI’s operation.38 In the other two 
models discussed above, the fatwas given by the SSB are the final say on all Sharia matters 
and can only be challenged in a court of law or a higher Sharia body such as the IBD in 
Pakistan39 or the Auqaf council in Kuwait. However, in the case of SSBs of IFIs in the UK, 
their role has been restricted to being merely an advisory body, since identifying them as having 
an executive role would mean that the members of the SSB would come under the purview of 
the ‘fit and proper criteria’ of the FCA40 and under the general duties owed by directors under 
sections 170-177 of the Companies Act 200641. Being labelled as merely advisory therefore 
has very far-reaching effects for SSBs: the IFIs present in UK (and other similar jurisdictions) 
are basically operating without any effective external supervision of the internal Sharia 
compliance mechanism of the IFIs, which is a systemic reputational risk for the Islamic finance 
industry.  
Other prominent issues arise in relation to the how the appointments of the internal 
Sharia Advisory Bodies (or Persons) are regulated, the terms of contracts for these Sharia 
Advisory Bodies, their remunerations and their qualifications.42 All of these issues emanate 
from the fact that without a proper regulatory oversight of the IFIs in the UK, consumers and 
                                                          
38 A Qarni, 'Regulatory Controls of Islamic Banks by Central Bank and Islamic Banks’ in The 
6th Expert-Level Meeting On Islamic Banking (1990) (May 26-28, Bahrain), Under The Auspices of 
Bahrain Monetary Agency. The Organization of the Islamic Conference 
39 <Http://Www.Sbp.Org.Pk/Departments/Ibd.Htm#H1>. (Departmental Objectives 5 And 6) 
40 <https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/FIT.pdf>. 
41       Companies Act 2006 chapter 46 
42 Assem Safieddine ‘Islamic Financial Institutions and Corporate Governance: New Insights 
for Agency Theory’ (2009) Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(2): 142–158. 
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other stakeholders of the industry will never be completely assured about the Sharia 
compliance of individual IFIs. The lack of confidence creates an environment of uncertainty 
and raises reputational and Sharia governance risks. Therefore, there is a need for a better 
supervisory framework for IFIs, specifically those IFIs which are operating on a self-regulatory 
basis in jurisdictions like the UK. These issues are dealt with in the following sections. 
 
This study of the three most common regulatory models for IFIs has highlighted the 
shortcomings and risks that are present for the Islamic finance industry at an international level. 
It is therefore argued that there is a need to move away from national regulatory models (as 
instituted in Pakistan and Malaysia) and onto a more internationally applicable model of 
regulation for IFIs, so that IFIs operating in all jurisdictions are accommodated, which I argue 
in the next section can be done via a Meta-Regulatory Framework for IFI’s. 
 
3. Meta-Regulations: A New Avenue for Islamic Finance? 
 
Meta-Regulation can be defined as ‘the proliferation of different forms of regulation 
(whether tools of state law or non-law mechanisms), each regulating one another’ and it is ‘a 
key feature of contemporary governance’.43 The concept behind Meta-regulation for financial 
institutions, posits that law is not the appropriate method to regulate stakeholder rights, since 
law will remove the flexibility needed for regulating financial institutions for the benefit of a 
large number of stakeholders.44 Since the use of black-letter laws and rules for regulating IFIs 
                                                          
43 C Hood, O James and C Scott ‘Regulation in government: has it increased, is it increasing, 
should it be diminished?’ Public Administration 78, 2, 283–304 
44 C Coglianese and Evan Mendelson ‘Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation,’ University of 
Pennsylvania, Penn Law School Public Law and Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 12-11. 
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is made all the more difficult for the Islamic finance industry across the jurisdictional spectrum 
due to the lack of the Sharia enforcement mechanism in many jurisdictions, the only practical 
venue left open for Islamic finance industry is a meta-regulatory enforcement framework. 
 
In other words, for Islamic finance, 
 
[m]eta-regulation (would) entail any form of regulation (whether by tools of state law 
or other mechanisms) that regulates any other form of regulation. Therefore, it might 
include legal regulation of self-regulation (e.g., putting an oversight board above a self-
regulatory professional association), non-legal methods of ‘regulating’ internal 
corporate self-regulation or management (e.g., voluntary accreditation to codes of good 
conduct, etc.), the regulation of national law-making by transnational bodies (such as 
the EU), and so on.45  
 
This holds true for an industry like Islamic finance for two reasons, the first being that 
there is no single authoritative body that can uniformly regulate all IFIs in different 
jurisdictions and the second being that the focus of the Islamic finance industry on the 
stakeholder nature of financial intermediation needs a flexible approach to regulation. As 
argued before, the stakeholder nature of Islamic finance is derived from the Maqasid al Sharia 
of financial intermediation under Islamic law and therefore we can make the argument that 
meta regulation is the best way to regulate the industry at an international level whereby the 
private sector, the government sector and the international supranational regulatory and 
standard setting bodies (IFSB/AAOIFI) are involved in devising a regulatory framework based 
on the principles espoused by the Maqasid al Sharia of financial intermediation.   
I therefore argue that applying a Meta-Regulatory Framework to the Islamic finance 
industry in this context is not trying to give a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution, but rather to elaborate 
                                                          
45 Levi-Faur, D. and J. Jordana. (2004) (Eds.) The Politics of Regulation, Institutions and 
Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
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on the fact that the regulatory approach for the Islamic finance industry ‘points to the need for 
social controls to encourage the beneficial effects of the institutional behaviours and to regulate 
or prevent the harmful effects.’46 For an industry like the Islamic finance industry, regulation 
via an international meta-regulatory framework is possibly the best way to balance out the 
competing interests of the free market mechanism with the need of financial stability for society 
in general, because meta regulation in this context is to encourage ‘those ways that outside 
regulators seek to induce regulated entities to develop their own self-regulatory responses.’47  
Thus, by using Meta-Regulatory Mechanisms, an international regulatory framework can 
be shaped which will fulfil the basic requirements for individual IFIs, namely Sharia-
compliance in IFIs operating in jurisdictions that do not accept Islamic law, as well in those 
IFIs operating in jurisdictions that follow Islamic law. The logical conclusion that follows from 
these arguments is that the stakeholder ethos, being the most likely to achieve the Maqasid al 
Sharia of financial intermediation, is the most appropriate philosophical basis for justifying the 
regulation and supervision of Islamic financial industry at both a macro (industry) level and a 
micro (institution) level and provides the necessary uniformity of rules, regulations and 
enforcement mechanisms that has been missing in the industry to date.  
Furthermore, the ethical foundations of the stakeholder point of view is in line with the 
Islamic financial ethos of equity, distributive justice, inclusive financial intermediation and the 
                                                          
46        Bradley R. Agle, Thomas Donaldson, R. Edward Freeman, Michael C. Jensen, Ronald K. 
Mitchell and Donna J. Wood, ‘Dialogue: Toward Superior Stakeholder Theory’ Business Ethics 
Quarterly / Volume 18 / Issue 02 / April 2008, pp 153-190.DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/beq200818214  (About DOI), Published online: 23 January 2015 
47 Coglianese, Cary and Mendelson, Evan, Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation (2010). THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK ON REGULATION, Martin Cave, Robert Baldwin, Martin Lodge, eds., 
2010; U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-11; U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ 
Research Paper No. 12-06. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2002755 
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welfare of a wider class of stakeholders.48 It can therefore be argued that the stakeholder point 
of view is in line with the wider Maqasid al Sharia of Islamic finance, and therefore the 
stakeholder governance and regulatory structure can be incorporated in the Meta-Regulatory 
framework being suggested by this article. 
Another reason why Meta-Regulation is particularly well suited for IFIs is because of the 
lack of a single international institution to oversee the operations and enforcement of regulatory 
standards of IFIs as an industry. The result is that a principle-based approach with an emphasis 
on ‘substance’ rather than ‘form’ (in ideological and practical terms) can be best achieved 
through Meta-Regulation.49 Consequently, the international standard-setting and regulatory 
bodies like the IFSB and the AAOIFI, being major stakeholders for the industry, need to ensure 
that their regulatory framework for Islamic financial institutions is in line with the stakeholder 
approach so that the essence (the Maqasid) of the Islamic teachings is comfortably 
amalgamated with the conventional corporate governance and regulatory practices. Finally, the 
strongest case for Meta Regulation of the Islamic finance industry may be made on the basis 
of the following assertion that ‘meta regulation may be most appropriate when the government 
lacks ready access to information about regulatory problems and their possible solutions, 
precisely the kinds of complex circumstances where more conventional forms of regulation 
face their greatest challenges’.50 So what should this Meta Regulatory framework look like? 
                                                          
48 R I Beekun, Islamic Business Ethics. Herndon, USA, 2002, The International Institute Of 
Islamic Thought. 
49 The form versus substance debate has been at the centre of modern day Islamic financial 
literature. These arguments have been made by the author in an upcoming (unpublished) paper; S S 
Hamid, ‘A rereading of the fundamentals of Islamic finance: principles of Contract law, Riba and 
Gharrar in light of the Maqasid Al Sharia and Maslaha principle’ (forthcoming in JISPIL December 
2015). 
50 Cary Coglianese and Evan Mendelson, ‘Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation’ (2010) U of 
Penn Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 12-11; U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research 
Paper No. 12-06. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2002755>. 
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4.     The ‘Framework’ 
 
The proposed framework is intended to cater to the unique stakeholder nature of the Islamic 
finance industry, incorporating the religious/ethical character into the supervisory and 
regulatory framework. The biggest challenge for the Islamic finance industry in general is to 
instil confidence in the public that the IFI is ‘Islamic’ in ‘substance’ and not just in name or 
‘form’. Therefore, it is imperative that a regulatory regime is put in place which can provide 
the necessary supervisory and regulatory support for the Islamic finance industry working in 
all jurisdictions. Moreover, this must be a regime which is principle-based and goal-oriented 
so that rather than relying on strict rules, the local regulators can easily and flexibly apply such 
principles to facilitate the working of the IFIs in an environment where there is transparency 
and accountability in their operations. This would entail the regulatory framework having 
clearly defined the Sharia principles so that along with making the public and stakeholders 
aware and well-informed of the Sharia compliance of each individual IFI’s operations, the 
regulatory regime is able to ensure prudent risk management, proper appointments to the SSB 
and that proper dispute settlement mechanisms pertaining to the Sharia disputes are in place. 
It should also allow for religious pronouncements by the Sharia scholars (the fatwas) to be 
incorporated into the overall framework of the IFI’s operational ambit. These aims, it is argued, 
can be achieved through a goal-based and/or performance-based Meta-Regulatory framework 
for IFIs. 
a. A Goal and Principles Based Meta-Regulatory Framework for Islamic 
Finance.  
 
The terms ‘goal-based’ and ‘performance-based’ regulation tend to be used interchangeably. 
In both goal-based and performance-based regulation, the regulation does not specify the 
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means of achieving compliance, but rather sets out goals that allow alternative ways to achieve 
regulatory compliance.51 Sometimes, these regulations promote or encourage the use of 
management systems with a continuous improvement cycle to move a corporate entity beyond 
simple compliance with a regulatory goal. The other major characteristic of a performance-
based regulatory framework is that it places more importance on reviews, inspections, audits 
and their control, frequency and timing. The latter are underpinned by a determination of where 
the board’s resources should best be focused. Tied to this regulatory approach is the use of 
performance indicators to assess relative levels of regulatory compliance by the regulated 
entities. 
  It is thus argued that a Meta-Regulatory Framework which is ‘smart’,52 proactive, 
flexible and responsive needs to be instituted for the Islamic finance industry to supervise and 
regulate the industry at an international level.53 It is clear that the international standard-setting 
agencies like the IFSB and the AAOIFI, which regularly publish best practices and guidelines, 
would need to be fully involved in the establishment of this new international regulatory 
framework.  
It is also pertinent to reiterate that the gap between the set standards and their actual 
application in practice lies at the enforcement end, since currently there is no effective body to 
enforce the standards set out by both the IFSB and the AAOIFI at the international level. The 
best method of enforcement is of course to incorporate these standards into the national 
regulatory framework of individual countries as is the case in Pakistan and Malaysia. However, 
                                                          
51 Cary Coglianese and Evan Mendelson, ‘Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation’ (2010) U of 
Penn Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 12-11; U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research 
Paper No. 12-06. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2002755>. 
52 Cary Coglianese and Evan Mendelson (n 51) 
53 Al-Jassar, J., 'Regulatory Environment and Strategic Directions in Islamic Finance' 




as we have already seen, such an approach is impractical for countries like the UK and other 
EU countries that do not accept the Sharia as a valid and separate source of law and leaves 
many of the IFIs unregulated and unsupervised, increasing the risk of a systemic reputational 
failure of the industry.  
 
b. A memorandum of understanding with the IFSB and AAOIFI 
  
For this aim of an effective enforcement mechanism to be attained, the state(s) that 
allow IFIs to operate within their jurisdiction(s) need to agree on common enforcement 
standards as well as developing guidelines in their frameworks so that a heightened sense of 
importance is placed on licensing, reviews, inspections and audits. To achieve this purpose, the 
major task of the international standard-setting bodies (the IFSB and AAOIFI) should be to 
expand and to develop performance indicators to assess relative levels of regulatory 
compliance in such a way that is principle- and outcome-focused and takes into account the 
basic principles of sharia (the Maqasid al Sharia).54  
It is therefore argued that a way forward for incorporate this Principle based framework 
into local regulatory standards is for the Jurisdictions that allow and encourage Islamic finance 
industry to set up shop in their jurisdiction to sign a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) 
with the international standard setting bodies like the IFSB/ AAOIFI. The MOU to allow for 
the internationally published regulatory standards to be applied to the Islamic finance industry 
in that particular jurisdiction. This practice would fill in the regulatory gap in countries that fall 
in the third category as classified in this paper e.g. England and other secular jurisdictions. This 
recommendation of an MOU between the host country and the regulatory body is in line with 
                                                          




other international banking supervisory/ regulatory regimes like the Basel accord55 pertaining 
to regulatory and supervisory standards. The Basel charter takes a similar approach to 
enforcement and implementation, it provides the following regarding the Legal status; ‘The 
BCBS does not possess any formal supranational authority. Its decisions do not have legal 
force. Rather, the BCBS relies on its members' commitments, as described in Section 5, to 
achieve its mandate.’56  
The Basel Charter then goes on to describe in Section 12 (which deals with its published 
standards); 
‘The BCBS sets standards for the prudential regulation and supervision of banks. The 
BCBS expects full implementation of its standards by BCBS members and their 
internationally active banks. However, BCBS standards constitute minimum 
requirements and BCBS members may decide to go beyond them. 
The Committee expects standards to be incorporated into local legal frameworks 
through each jurisdiction's rule-making process5 within the pre-defined time frame 
established by the Committee. If deviation from literal transposition into local legal 
frameworks is unavoidable, members should seek the greatest possible equivalence of 
standards and their outcome.’57 
 
These examples from the Basel accord charter show that a very similar framework for 
supervision and regulation can be instituted for the Islamic finance industry. As a matter of 
fact, the IFSB already has as its members the central banks/ regulators of almost all of the 
countries that have the presence of the Islamic finance industry. Therefore, the suggestions 
made in this chapter are furthering the ideals of an international regulatory/ standard setting 
regime by giving a practical blue print of the enforcement mechanism for the Industry.  
                                                          
55   < https://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm>  
56       https://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm  
57     https://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm  
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The implementation of the suggested Principle based framework in this chapter can be 
done on a country specific basis, with each jurisdiction agreeing to certain minimum principle 
standards (as suggested in this chapter) and then customising the rest of the regulatory regime 
as per their own national standards.  
So, one way of practically implementing these standards is based on instituting 
performance indicators that are Sharia-based alongside conventional financial indicators. This 
will tailor the governance structures to the needs of the IFI.58 The aim of this principles-based 
framework would be to provide supplementary standards specifically for the sake of internal 
and external Sharia governance in a particular jurisdiction (and not in lieu of existing national 
regulations). In the case of a conflict between conventional governance and regulatory 
standards, the individual IFI should have the freedom to decide which standards they intend to 
apply; if the local conventional regulatory standards are in line with the standards proposed by 
the IFSB or the AAOIFI then the local standards may be applied (as is the case in Pakistan and 
Malaysia). However, where it is deemed that the national regulatory standards do not allow for 
a proper sharia-compliant framework to be instituted and are laxer than those set out by the 
IFSB and AAOIFI, the IFI must opt for the Sharia-compliant option, whilst maintaining 
compliance with the national laws and regulation as far as possible.  
It is unlikely that there would be any major conflict between the national regulatory 
standards and the standards set out by the IFSB or AAIOFI, since most of the governance and 
regulatory standards issued by these bodies follow the best practices as already suggested by 
the IMF, Basel accords and the World Bank.59 Secondly, the IFSB’s standard setting body is 
                                                          
58 Most governance and regulatory standards set out by the IFSB and the AAOIFI already have 
considered the standards set by other international bodies like the OECD, WB and IMF and tailored 
them to IFI’s. 
59 Luca Errico and Mira Farhbaksh ‘Islamic Banking: Issues In Prudential Regulation And 
Supervision’(1998) IMF Money And Exchange Department, Wp/98/30, Working Paper 
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made up of representatives from almost all those jurisdictions where IFIs are operating, which 
means that the regulatory and governance standards that are issued by the IFSB have already 
taken into account most national regulatory requirements. 
 
c. Certificates of Compliance: A Move Towards a Principle-Based Regulatory 
Framework 
 
In light of the arguments made in the previous sections I argue that the best Sharia 
enforcement mechanism for IFIs would be to institute a system of ‘certification’ by the two 
main regulatory standard setting bodies, the IFSB and the AAOIFI, for any financial 
institutions that wish to operate as IFIs. In this regard, these two bodies should be given the 
mandate to issue ‘certificates of compliance’ for all financial institutions desirous of operating 
as sharia-compliant institutions. These certificates would be issued to confirm that the financial 
institution in question is indeed operating as an IFI and has complied with all the sharia and 
governance standards laid down by either the IFSB or AAOIFI (whichever standard is chosen 
by the jurisdiction). These certificates would give validity to the Sharia compliance aspects of 
the IFI and would be aimed at instilling confidence in the stakeholders that they are indeed 
dealing with a Sharia compliant financial institution. This system of certification is in line with 
the Meta-Regulatory approach best suited to the Islamic finance industry, whereby the self-
regulatory nature of IFIs working in secular jurisdictions can be catered for whilst maintaining 
an international harmonised supra regulatory framework.  
It is for this reason that no particular national regulatory and enforcement approach can 
be deemed entirely appropriate to cater for the differences in regulatory practices for Islamic 
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finance institutions at an international level.60 The best way to ensure compliance with the 
regulatory and supervisory standards of the AAOIFI and the IFSB is to give these standards 
making bodies the power not only to issue but also to revoke ‘certificates of compliance’. This 
would allow all IFIs’ stakeholders to deal with any given IFI with confidence, knowing 
undoubtedly whether a particular IFI is actually Sharia-compliant or not and whether it is 
indeed following good corporate governance practices as set out by the IFSB and AAOIFI.  
These certificates of compliance follow the practice in the Islamic Halal food industry, 
reflecting the simple idea that the best mechanism for ensuring Sharia compliance in a 
jurisdiction where the Sharia is not a recognised source of law is to ensure that only those 
financial institutions can label themselves as ‘Islamic’ financial institutions which follow 
established Sharia standards. By doing so, and keeping true to its religious and stakeholder 
norms, the industry will benefit immensely. The use of this certification process will also allow 
for Islamic finance as an industry to be truly stakeholder-oriented because establishing such a 
certification process ensures that the stakeholders dealing with the industry (as well as the 
individual institutions) are made aware of the ‘Islamic’ status of the IFI, thereby allowing 
customers, lenders, investors, employees, suppliers and regulators to make informed decisions 
regarding the Sharia compliance of services and financial products on offer by individual IFIs. 
In essence, by following the stakeholder principled framework and instituting a certification 
process, the industry’s processes and procedures will become more transparent thereby 
decreasing the reputational and systemic risks as well as enhancing the corporate governance 
of IFIs. This would be a truly ‘Meta Regulatory’ Framework, where the individual IFIs 
operating in non-Islamic jurisdiction can self-regulate themselves to a reasonable level, but 
                                                          
60 Surprising the FSA (FCA) talks about the fact that they would not be adopting any one 
approach to regulation. 
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with that self-regulation overseen by the process of certification by the supranational standard-
setting bodies, thereby ensuring at least a minimal level of Sharia compliance. 
           It is accepted that for such a Meta-Regulatory Framework to be successful, national 
regulators need to be willing to accept these standards as decisive on all aspects relating to the 
Sharia in an IFI, especially in such jurisdictions where the Sharia is not accepted as a valid 
source of law. They will need to encourage and facilitate such IFIs in obtaining these 
‘certificates’, as these will give a boost to the local IFIs in terms of stakeholder confidence in 
their operations, as well as encouraging more competition amongst the local IFIs. This 
endeavour, it is believed will translate into tangible financial results in the long term for the 
country’s financial system by eliminating systemic and institutional financial risks for the 
Islamic finance industry. 
There are several regulatory issues that would be key to the effectiveness of the 
‘certificates of compliance’ in reflecting the ‘Islamic’ nature of the industry, it is those that we 
turn to:  
 
i. The Criterion for Issuance of the Certificates of Compliance: A Sharia 
Principle Based Criteria 
 
Certificates of compliance should be based on a number of key operational aspects of the 
financial institutions. These would comprise the Sharia compatibility of the IFI’s operation, its 
governance framework (including the appointments of SSB and the apportionment of the 
powers and duties of the board of directors and the SSB), dispute resolution mechanisms, the 
decision-making process of the SSB and their fatwa pronouncements, information disclosures, 
adherence to good corporate governance practices as laid down by the IFSB and the AAOIFI, 
and sharia-compliance audit processes. The idea behind these certificates is to ensure that both 
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sharia governance and conventional corporate issues are catered for. The details of how the 
compatibility criteria will be set up may be left up to the two standard-setting bodies. 
 
ii. Agency Costs and Revocation of Certificates of Compliance: The Process of 
Sharia Audits  
 
To further facilitate a proper enforcement framework for IFIs at an international level, 
the international standard-setting bodies should be given the authority to carry out sharia and 
performance audits biannually (or annually). Carrying out such audits would ensure that 
individual IFIs maintain their compliance with established standards and can therefore be 
issued the ‘certificates of compliance’. These certificates of compliance would be one way for 
the local regulators to recognise the IFI as a separate and distinct entity from the local banks, 
therefore accepting that the sharia aspects of the IFI have been complied with and would 
therefore form a secondary licensing regime. This certification process will take the regulatory 
burden off the local regulators and they would be able to focus simply on the issue of 
compliance with the local regulation. By doing so, both the IF industry as well as the local 
regulators benefit greatly and complement each other. 
Instituting such a regulatory framework would mean increasing compliance costs for 
individual IFIs, especially those IFIs which are working in countries like the UK and other non-
Islamic jurisdictions without the requisite state-level recognition of their special religious 
nature. To add to this problem, there may also be a shortage of suitably qualified sharia scholars 
in such jurisdictions which would also add to the costs of compliance. In the long term, 
however, the initial costs of obtaining the compliance certificates would eventually be balanced 
out by an increased level of confidence by stakeholders and by local regulators. In turn, this 
would mean increased financial stability and consequently less chance of bank defaults and 
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bank runs for the Islamic finance industry as a whole. The alternative - allowing an IFI to 
operate without proper Sharia compliance - is likely to lead to a loss of confidence by the 
consumers, customers, regulators and creditors, and may lead to a systemic reputation and 
strategic failure of the whole Islamic financial industry in that region.  
In this process of the Sharia certification, the role of the IFSB and the AAOIFI should 
also include the powers to revoke the ‘certificates’ in the case of an IFI failing to follow the 
established the Sharia governance standards. This process would be an integral part of the 
process of annual audits detailed in the previous paragraph. By exercising this power of 
revocation, the IFSB and AAOIFI would supervise and ensure that only those IFIs which are 
truly sharia compliant in form and substance are certified. Whilst the ‘certificate of 
compliance’ may be withdrawn by the IFSB and AAOIFI based on the Sharia non-compliance, 
the national regulator would still be able to decide according to its own regulatory standards 
and laws whether the financial institution qualifies to function as a conventional financial 
institution or not. This way, both aspects of prudential regulation can be achieved without 
compromising the integrity of either system and at the same time strengthening the market for 
the operations of IFIs.  
It is also recommended here that in case of the local regulator wanting to devise a 
separate regulatory framework (on the same lines as has been done in Pakistan, Malaysia and 
Iran) for the local Islamic finance industry, they may be allowed to do so on the basis of the 
sharia compliance standards issued by the IFSB or the AAOIFI.  
 
iii. The SSB and Fatwas: The Form versus Substance Debate 
 
Another regulatory aspect that has caused some concern for the Islamic finance industry 
is the regulation and harmonisation of internal Sharia governance mechanisms, specifically 
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related to the role of the SSB and their religious pronouncements (fatwas). I would suggest that 
aspects relating to the fatwas and their admissibility should be brought under the exclusive 
purview of the IFSB and the AAOIFI via the certification process mentioned earlier, 
specifically if the local legislature is not willing to make any amendments in its regulatory 
framework to accommodate the fatwas. Even where these legislative amendments have been 
made (as is the case in jurisdictions like Pakistan, Malaysia and Iran), they should be made in 
consultation with the IFSB and AAOIFI, either by selecting such regulatory standards that have 
already been published by the two standard setting bodies or selecting those which are in line 
with the national regulatory framework and supplementing the national regulatory standards 
with those published by the IFSB and AAOIFI.  
So, for example in Pakistan the SSB’s of the IFIs have the power to issue a religious 
pronouncement (fatwa) regarding the suitability of financial products/services being utilised 
by the IFI, and the fatwa forms an integral part of the operation of the IFI. However, if the 
BOD or the management of the IFI does not obtain the fatwa before launching a product, that 
whole process can be made void ab initio on the basis of it not having complied with the internal 
sharia approval process as the regulations/ laws deem the fatwas as an integral part of the whole 
process.61 Secondly for countries like Pakistan and Malaysia, the SSBs of individual IFIs can 
challenge the BOD and the management on aspects related to sharia compliance, as the SSB 
have legal standing as an integral part of the IFI. However, this is not the case in UK and other 
non-Islamic jurisdictions, where the final arbiter and decision-makers are the BOD/ Executive 
management whose decisions can only be challenged by the AGM in very limited 
circumstances.  
                                                          




Without making the requisite regulatory and legal changes in the framework for IFIs, it 
looks increasingly difficult to argue that the SSB’s religious pronouncements will ever have 
legally binding statuses in the eyes of the local regulators in non-Islamic jurisdiction. This 
brings into question the whole practice of allowing the SSBs a role in the decision-making 
process in IFIs operating in non-Islamic jurisdictions. Without formal legal standing the SSB 
is nothing more than an advisory body in the IFI, and their fatwas, which ought to have legal 
standing, are nothing more than advisory opinions, which can be ignored and overlooked by 
the management of the IFI. This highlights the reputational risks for the IFIs operating outside 
of the Islamic jurisdictions, which may lead to a systemic failure for the industry without proper 
sharia compliance mechanism in place and needs to be addressed at an international level via 
meta-regulatory mechanisms.  
 
iv. Enhancing the Effectiveness of the SSB: Reconfiguring the Articles of 
Association. 
 
Building up on the previous point on the lack of legal standing of the SSB, I argue that in order 
to enhance the powers of the SSB and mitigate the possible concerns caused by the imbalance 
of power between the SSB and the executive board, there should be a mandatory requirement 
in the audit process instituted by the IFSB/AAOIFI to ensure that the IFIs have amended their 
articles of association (the constitutional document of the IFI) to incorporate the SSB as an 
integral part of the decision-making process. By amending the articles of association 
(constitution) of the IFI, the exact ambit of powers for the SSB can be specifically laid down, 
which would allow the SSBs to enforce their opinions (fatwas) via local corporate laws and get 
the needed legal validation. 
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  In doing so, each IFI’s constitution can specify the recourse to a dispute resolution 
method (both internal and external) in case of a conflict of opinion between the SSB and the 
BOD. For example, in case of a conflict of opinion and a deadlock between the SSB and the 
BOD/ management regarding a matter of Sharia compliance, the Articles (constitution) of the 
IFI could specify recourse to a local or international specialist arbitration body which 
specialises in Islamic finance, rather to than the local judiciary. This would be a preferable 
solution because the local judiciary of a secular jurisdiction would not usually be well-versed 
in the legal aspects of Islamic finance and would thus be ill-suited to give an opinion on such 
matters. It follows that if the powers of both the BOD and the SSB are clearly set out in the 
constitution of an IFI, the chances of conflict per se are reduced. However, the issue of 
enforcement and validity of religious pronouncements (fatwas) by the SSB will remain 
contentious in a non-Islamic jurisdiction. 
There must therefore be better cooperation and coordination, particularly between and 
within governments, the financial and security regulatory authorities and the IFSB and the 
AAOIFI, to try to achieve some uniformity in the regulatory environment in the jurisdictions 
in which IFIs are currently operating.  
It is also argued that a failure to develop this coordination at the jurisdiction level will 
lead to Sharia arbitrage and forum shopping by the individual IFIs and may give way to a ‘race 
to the bottom’, causing the IFIs to move between jurisdictions looking for the most relaxed 
regulatory environment. This could risk IFIs abandoning (deliberately or accidentally) the basic 
tenets of Sharia, which could turn out to be a systemic issue and may lead to the loss in 
confidence across the globe in Islamic finance industry. This means that the industry must 
focus on the international regulatory and supervisory aspects of IFIs and concentrate all its 
energy in devising a framework that not only stabilises but also encourages public and 
stakeholder confidence in the industry at an international forum. The suggestion regarding the 
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changes to be brought in the articles of association (constitutional document) of the individual 
IFI will help in making the internal sharia compliance mechanisms (like the SSB’s fatwas) 
more effective, thereby making the industry less open to reputational risks and at the same time 
more Sharia compliant, even in those jurisdictions where the Sharia is not accepted as a main 
source of law. It is reiterated here that a ‘Basel’ type of supervisory framework will be the best 
possible solution. 
 
v. Dispute Resolution 
 
Keeping in view the previous discussion regarding the issues surrounding the possible 
conflicts of interest between the SSB and the BOD, this article  also argues that any disputes 
that may arise regarding Sharia compliance in IFI’s operating in non-Islamic jurisdictions 
should be handled by any such organisation which has expertise in the resolution of disputes 
related to Sharia.62 It is therefore asserted that the IFSB/AAOIFI should recommend and 
institute such dispute resolution methods in consultation with national regulators which would 
be deemed appropriate to the Islamic finance industry, especially where the local courts are not 
well-versed in Sharia.  
A possible option for integrating such a dispute resolution mechanism is to have a 
mandatory arbitration clause (an ADR clause) in the constitution documents of all IFIs 
operating in secular jurisdictions. By doing so the IFIs will have access to specialised dispute 
resolution bodies, who in turn would have access to sharia experts and would therefore be in 
a much better position than a secular judiciary to give decisions on internal and external Sharia 
compliance matters. An example of such a body already operating in the UK is the Muslim 
                                                          
62 Zulkifi Hasan (n 28). 
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Arbitration Tribunal63, which primarily deals with Family law issues in the UK. A similar (or 
perhaps the same) body could be set up with expertise in Islamic finance and help the local 
Muslim communities in handling disputes pertaining to financial matters in line with Islamic 
injunctions.  
 
vi. SSB Qualifications: The Regulatory Response 
 
This brings us to the critical issue of the selection of the Sharia qualified persons suitable 
for modern day IFIs, especially in the secular jurisdictions like the UK. There is currently no 
requirement for any formal licensing and qualification for an individual to become a SSB 
member, which means that there is no oversight of the appointment process. This is more of an 
issue for those jurisdictions where the Sharia is not accepted as a source of law and where there 
is no Central Sharia Supervisory Authority. This raises a number of concerns for the operations 
of IFIs and their ability to comply with the Sharia norms. There is clearly a need to have a 
proper system of recognition, licensing and qualifications for the members of SSBs. 
Considering the key role that the SSB plays, the selection criterion should be on the same lines 
as the FCA’s criteria for a ‘fit and proper’ person.64  A similar criteria for a ‘fit and proper’ 
person does exist for an IFI operating in Pakistan,65 but as has been mentioned no such criteria 
exists in most other jurisdiction. One of the major reasons for such a lack is rooted in the basic 
non-recognition of ‘fatwas’ as a valid source of law in many of the jurisdictions like UK and 
other EU countries. 
                                                          
63  <http://matribunal.com/application-form.php > 
 
64 <https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/FIT.pdf>. 
65           <http://www.sbp.org.pk/ibd/2004/CIR03-Annexure-IV.pdf>  
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The suggestion here is that the individual members of each SSB ought to be approved 
or acknowledged as Sharia-qualified by the IFSB or the AAOIFI (or any other recognised 
standard’s body) before being allowed to undertake the task of issuing fatwas and sitting on 
the SSB. This will require the industry to move towards a standardised testing and qualification 
process for Sharia-qualified persons. In the Meta-Regulatory Framework that is being 
recommended here, the supranational bodies (IFSB and the AAOIFI) need to institute a 
standardised ‘fit and proper sharia qualified person test’ which should allow individuals 
desirous of the role to meet certain minimum standards before being appointed as a Sharia-
qualified person. As Sharia compliance forms the major part of the operation of the Islamic 
finance industry it has to be streamlined at an international Meta-Regulatory level. These 
Sharia qualification statuses can either be granted on the basis of sitting a qualification exam 
or on the basis of the previous experience of the individuals already undertaking these roles in 
the Islamic finance industry. The more effective and efficient approach would be to institute a 
standardised international test on the same lines as qualifying exams for accounting and finance 
professionals,66 hence bringing in much-needed uniformity to this important regulatory aspect. 
It should be acknowledged that a considerable amount of work has already been undertaken 
in issuing Sharia-qualified scholar statuses across the globe: Malaysia, the UK, Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan have all set examples of the kind of qualifications that are 
appropriate for the Sharia scholars working in the Islamic finance industry, as scholars 
qualified from these jurisdictions have gone on to sit on a number of different SSBs across the 
globe. With many different bodies already issuing such a qualification,67 one option would be 









for the IFSB and the AAOFI to allow these local academic and licensing bodies to issue these 
qualifications by simply listing on their own websites which qualifications would be deemed 
acceptable for which roles. This way all the different stakeholders and IFIs alike will have the 
confidence that the Sharia qualified person (or body) is indeed qualified to decide on the Sharia 
aspects. 
vii.   Achieving the ‘Public Good’ through the Meta-Regulatory Framework and the 
Normative Mission Statement of the IFIs 
 
The Islamic finance industry has come a long way in modern times and has made strides in 
almost all aspects of its operation. However, the regulatory pressure to abide by conventional 
governance and regulatory practices seems to be leading the industry to lose focus on the 
fundamental reason for its existence i.e. to facilitate and promote socio-economic justice in 
society and all its stakeholders. The industry has had to adapt neo-liberal governance and 
regulatory norms, mimicking the profit-making ethos of conventional financial institutions. 
This regulatory dilemma surrounding the Islamic finance industry has been debated under the 
rubric of the ‘form’ versus ‘substance’ debate by practitioners and academics, highlighting the 
dichotomy between the ideological essence (the Maqasid al Sharia) and practice of financial 
intermediation in Islamic financial laws. 
This mounting regulatory pressure generates a need for an internationally acceptable 
stakeholder-based meta-regulatory framework that balances out the diverse aspects of IFIs, i.e. 
their religious origins and the modern application of those religious principles. This articlehas 
made the case for a Meta-Regulatory Framework that achieves some uniformity between the 
                                                          
Finance-MSc.aspx , http://www.inceif.org/academic-programmes/chartered-Islamic -finance-
professional/ , http://www.amanaglobal.com/training/ , https://www.dur.ac.uk/dcief/ , 
http://www.Islamic -banking.com/Default.aspx , http://www.nibaf.gov.pk/Pages/Islamic .htm 
39 
 
regulatory practices amongst all the different jurisdictions where IFIs are operating, both 
Islamic and secular. The self-regulation of IFIs in secular jurisdictions would thereby have a 
certain amount of international supervisory oversight via a system of licensing and certification 
by the international standard setting bodies i.e. IFSB and the AAOIFI. For the proposed 
framework to be effective, it needs to concentrate on the ‘substance’ of the Islamic financial 
intermediation model by incorporating the Maqasid al Sharia doctrine into its standards.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Taking into account all the suggestions made in this article, it can be argued that a 
‘smart’, reflexive and principle-based Meta-Regulatory Framework is the optimal way of 
achieving the ‘common good’ as a regulatory aim for Islamic finance as an industry. The 
requirement to achieve the ‘common good’ can be deemed a sub-set of the normative ‘public 
good’ (Maslaha) in Islamic jurisprudence and thus conforms to the ideological basis of the 
larger Maqasid al Sharia of financial intermediation by the banks and other institutions under 
Islamic law. With the special emphasis of Islamic finance on achieving welfare for the whole 
of society, it has been argued that in normative as well as practical terms, the purpose of the 
Islamic economic system is the achievement of the public good (Maslaha) by ensuring a just 
and equitable distribution of wealth amongst the members of society. Further to this aim, the 
presence of a carefully devised meta-regulatory framework for IFIs which focuses on 
stakeholder practices and embodies business ethics is not only a requirement but also has clear 
advantages for the practice and the theory of IFIs at the level of the individual, industry and the 
society.  
It is therefore argued here, that since the Maqasid al Sharia of IFIs is to facilitate and 
act as intermediaries to ensure a just and equitable distribution of wealth in society, the 
regulatory framework should put a special emphasis on the internal corporate governance 
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framework modelled on the stakeholder corporate governance norms. The stakeholder theory 
with its focus on the principles of honesty, integrity, ethical trading, societal responsibility, 
stakeholder justice, employee participation, investor protection and transparency is in line with 
the true maqasid al sharia of financial intermediation and thus must be made as the practical 
guideline for the meta-regulatory standards being argued for in this paper. This can be achieved 
by instituting a framework of licensing, certification and supervisory oversight by the two-
main standard setting bodies on the same footing as the Basel accord. 
 
In summary, the aim of a regulatory framework for IFIs therefore ought to be:  
 
to support social, ethical and economic development - providing the citizens, the 
depositors, the investors and other stakeholders who are directly and indirectly involved, 
with the protection and confidence they need to feel confident when dealing with the Islamic 
finance industry that the Industry is well-structured, safe, secure, Sharia complaint, well 
governed and risk averse. 
 
